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One of the issues most often raised in 
discussions of the Economic Partnership 
Agreement (EPA) between the European 
Union and Pacific island countries and 
the Pacific Agreement on Closer Economic 
Relations (PACER) Plus negotiations 
between Australia and New Zealand and 
Pacific island countries is the impact on the 
Pacific islands of the reduction or elimination 
of the revenue they collect from tariffs. The 
expected tariff revenue losses Pacific island 
countries will suffer are being used more 
and more often to criticise these proposed 
agreements. Because it serves the interests 
of the protected industries in Pacific island 
countries to present a negative picture of 
the trade agreements, they focus on the loss 
of tariff revenue. Many non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) are also antagonistic 
towards trade agreements involving Pacific 
island countries, claiming that they will 
face serious negative consequences if 
they sign up. Their key concerns include: 
‘a dramatic loss of government revenue’, 
‘potential job losses and business closures’ 
and ‘higher taxes for the poor’ (PANG 
2009a:5). It is argued that because of the 
loss of government revenue due to trade 
liberalisation, governments ‘will have to 
cut services (like health and education) 
to their peoples’ (PANG 2008). Further, 
governments will have no choice but ‘to 
downsize their public sector—putting 
more people out of work. Any loss of jobs 
for nurses, teachers and public servants 
would place an added burden on women 
who work in these sectors and increase the 
push to migrate’ (PANG 2009b:1).
Law professor Jane Kelsey (2004b:10) 
writes in the People’s guide to PACER 
that ‘“free trade” agreements are a new 
form of colonization’. Kelsey lists several 
‘protections’ that ‘would have to go’—one 
of which should make her think of its 
implications, as she states that ‘tariffs…are 
a tax that makes imports more expensive 
than locally produced goods so as to 
protect local producers who can’t otherwise 
compete, and to provide governments with 
revenue’.
We therefore pose some questions to 
Kelsey and the NGOs that use her services, 
as well as to the governments that provide 
tariffs to industries that ‘can’t otherwise 
compete’: who pays for the more expensive 
imports as the result of the imposition of 
tariffs or non-tariff barriers on imports? 
Would it not be a good idea for consumers 
to pay less for higher-quality goods and 
have more disposable income for other 
goods and services? As we have seen before 
the reform of telecommunications markets 
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in the Pacific, local industries that do not 
have to worry about competition have 
no incentive to invest in better-quality, 
lower-cost, consumer-friendly products or 
production methods. Could the additional 
disposable consumer income resulting from 
the lower prices of imports increase business 
opportunities for Pacific islanders—not only 
for domestic industries but for those who 
distribute the imports?
With regard to food security, the Pacific 
Network on Globalisation (PANG 2009a:5) 
argues that there will be a ‘reduced ability 
to support the agricultural sector’ due to 
trade liberalisation. This issue is, however, 
addressed in the Interim Partnership 
Agreement (IPA) signed between the 
European Union and Papua New Guinea 
and Fiji, which gives an idea of the European 
Union’s approach. In the IPA, with respect 
to food security, it is stated that
the Parties acknowledge that the 
removal of barriers to trade between the 
Parties, as envisaged in this Agreement, 
may pose significant challenges to 
producers in the agricultural and food 
sectors and agree to consult with each 
other on these issues…and…where 
compliance with the provisions of this 
Agreement leads to problems with the 
availability of, or access to, foodstuffs 
or other products essential to ensure 
food security of a Party or Pacific 
State and where this situation gives 
rise or is likely to give rise to major 
difficulties for such a Party or Pacific 
State, that Party or Pacific State may 
take appropriate measures. (Council 
of the European Union 2009:Article 
46, p.77)
Chapter 6 of the IPA also includes excep-
tions to tariff reductions, with Article 42 as a 
‘General Exception Clause’ to accommodate 
the necessity to protect public safety and 
public morals or public order, to protect 
human, animal or plant life, or to secure 
compliance with laws and regulations not 
inconsistent with provisions of the agree-
ment. These include privacy protection for 
individuals, safety, customs enforcement 
and the protection of intellectual property 
rights. Other exceptions are related to the 
import/export of gold and silver, the 
protection of natural artistic, historical or 
archaeological values, the conservation of 
exhaustible natural resources (for example, 
domestic restrictions on the production or 
consumption of goods), domestic supply 
or consumption of services, and domestic 
investors. The exception clause also applies 
if the reason is inconsistent with Article 23 
on ‘National Treatment’—provided that 
differences in treatment are valid and are 
applied to ensure effective or equitable 
imposition or collection of direct taxes with 
respect to economic activities, investors or 
service suppliers from the European Union 
or the Pacific island countries. Article 43 
gives further exceptions with respect to 
national security. The IPA with the European 
Union and the PACER agreement with 
Australia and New Zealand address not 
just all the claims and fears of the Pacific 
island countries and NGOs in one way or 
the other, but more importantly address all 
common barriers to trade identified by the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) and by 
the Trading Across Borders section of the 
World Bank’s (2009a) Doing Business Report 
2009.
As most of the arguments against trade 
liberalisation in Pacific island countries are 
based on the perceived problems arising 
from reductions in tariff revenue, section 
two of this article takes a closer look at the 
revenue structure of Pacific island countries, 
while section three reviews potential tariff 
revenue losses from the EPA and PACER. 
Section four analyses alternative revenue 
sources for Pacific island countries. 
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The revenue structure of the 
Pacific island countries
Tariff revenue is still one of the main sources 
of government revenue for several Pacific 
countries (Table 1). The table shows total 
government revenue and grants as a per-
centage of gross domestic product (GDP) 
and customs revenue as a percentage of total 
government revenue. The revenue raised by 
a value-added tax (VAT),1 if in place, is re-
ported as well as its share of total revenue.
The total of revenues and grants as a 
percentage of GDP is extremely high in 
Kiribati and Niue—more than 90 per cent. In 
Tuvalu, the percentage is even higher than 
the country’s GDP. Fiji and Palau have the 
lowest percentages—at 24.1 per cent and 
27.6 per cent, respectively. In most Pacific 
island countries, the total of revenue and 
grants as a percentage of GDP is between 
30 and 36 per cent.
In several countries, customs revenue is 
more than 20 per cent of total revenue and 
grants. Nauru’s reliance on customs revenue 
is by far the highest at 61.2 per cent. In the 
majority of countries the share is below 17 
per cent. In some countries—for example, 
Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), Palau, 
Papua New Guinea, Marshall Islands and 
Samoa—the share is below 10 per cent, 
indicating a much broader diversification 
of government revenue and weakening 
dependency on customs revenues. This 
point is underlined by the average level of 
tariffs applied on all products, which, not 
surprisingly, is lower in those countries 
where the share of customs revenue is low. 
The opposite is true for countries with 
high average tariff levels, such as Fiji and 
Vanuatu, where average tariffs are about 40 
and 25 per cent, respectively (International 
Trade Centre 2009).
Several countries have adopted a VAT, 
which contributes significantly to total 
revenue (Papua New Guinea excepted) and 
offers an option for diversification away 
from customs revenue dependency.
Potential revenue loss from trade 
liberalisation
The potential loss in tariff revenue due to the 
implementation of the IPA/EPA and PACER 
has been the subject of several studies. 
Filmer and Lawson (1999) and Narsey 
(2004) measured the cumulative revenue 
losses from potential free-trade agreements, 
including EPAs and PACER. Scollay, 
Gilbert and Collins (1998) estimated tariff 
revenue losses from free-trade agreements 
including PACER. In a recent study by 
Watergall Consulting Limited (2007), the 
potential losses of revenue (as percentages 
of total tax revenue) from preferential trade 
agreements, including the EPA and PACER, 
were estimated.
The findings of Scollay, Gilbert and 
Collins (1998), Filmer and Lawson (1999) 
and Narsey (2004) are summarised (Table 
2). The three studies show partially different 
results (for example, PACER’s impact on 
Fiji), but agree on the impact of the EPAs. 
Filmer and Lawson (1999) and Narsey (2004) 
‘mostly’ agree that an EPA will cause only 
marginal tariff revenue losses.
There are two exceptions—namely, 
Kiribati and Vanuatu—where the tariff rev-
enue loss is considered to be relatively high.3 
For PACER, there is no obvious consensus. 
For example, for Fiji, Filmer and Lawson 
(1999) predict a 15 per cent tariff revenue 
loss, whereas Narsey (2004) estimates 52 
per cent and Scollay, Gilbert and Collins 
(1998) make an estimate of 66 per cent. For 
Samoa and Vanuatu, there are similarly 
inconclusive results. One reason for the 
differences could be that the studies were 
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Table 1 Statistics relating to government revenue, 20082
Country Total revenue 
and grants/
GDP (%)
Average tariff 
rate (%)
VAT rate (%) Customs 
revenue/ 
total revenue 
and grants 
(%)
VAT/total 
revenue and 
grants  
(%)
Cook Islands 34.2 7a 12.5 11.2 31.9
Fiji Islands 24.1 39.55 12.5 16.4 31.4
Federated States of 
Micronesia (2006)
59.1 4.21 - 6.4 -
Kiribati 90.9 17.22 - 13.6 -
Nauru (2007) 82.9 n.a. - 61.2 -
Niue (2006) 90.0 n.a. - 21.4 -
Palau (2006) 27.6 3.02 - 6.7 -
Papua New Guinea 36.1 4.88 10.0 5.5 8.3
Republic of Marshall 
Islands (2007)
65.2 9a - 7.6 -
Samoa 32.5 7a 12.5 9.4 23.1
Solomon Islands 65.9 13.05 - 25.0 -
Tonga 35.7 24.09 15.0 27.5 36.2
Tuvalu 126.0 15a - 21.8 -
Vanuatu 30.1 25.13 12.5 23.0 27.5
n.a. not applicable, - zero, a average customs duty for 2006 according to Watergall (2007). 
Notes: For Tonga, the average tariff rate applied on agricultural products (ATAoAP) is 60.07 per cent and the 
average tariff applied on industrial products (ATAoIP) is 18.15 per cent; for the Federated States of Micronesia, 
ATAoAP is 4.42 per cent and ATAoIP is 4.19 per cent; for Kiribati, ATAoAP is 49.21 per cent and ATAoIP is 15 per 
cent; for Palau, ATAoAP is 1.68 per cent and ATAoIP is 3.11 per cent (medical products, according to Watergall 
Consulting Limited [2007] are tariff free); for Papua New Guinea, ATAoAP is 19.32 per cent and ATAoIP is 2.48 
per cent; for Marshall Islands, according to Watergall Consulting Limited (2007), the duty rate for food is 5 
per cent, for most other products it is 8 per cent and variable higher rates are applied on tobacco, alcohol and 
fuel; for Samoa, according to Watergall Consulting Limited (2007), import duties are declining gradually; for 
Solomon Islands, ATAoAP is 39.18 per cent and ATAoIP is 8.84 per cent; for Tonga, ATAoAP is 60.07 per cent 
and ATAoIP is 18.15 per cent; for Vanuatu, ATAoAP is 90.05 per cent and ATAoIP is 14.49 per cent. According to 
Watergall Consulting Limited (2007), Samoa, Fiji and Vanuatu have adopted the six-digit HS system for customs 
classifications, while Solomon Islands is using the HS02 system and is in the process of changing to the six-digit 
HS system. 
Sources: Watergall Consulting Limited, 2007. Responding to the revenue consequences of trade reforms in the forum 
island countries, Final report (September), Watergall Consulting Limited, Port Vila, Vanuatu; International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), 2009. International Finance Statistics (IFS) 2008, International Monetary Fund, Washington, 
DC; World Bank, 2009b. World Development Indicators 2008, The World Bank, Washington, DC; Asian 
Development Bank (ADB), 2009. Key Indicators 2008, Asian Development Bank, Manila; United Nations Statistics 
Division (UNSD), 2008. National Accounts 2008, Statistics Division, United Nations, New York. Average tariff 
rates were derived from the International Trade Centre (2009).
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undertaken for different periods and 
different assumptions and methods were 
applied. The tariff revenue loss is expressed 
in three ways: in terms of the percentage 
of total tariff revenue (Scollay, Gilbert and 
Collins); in terms of the percentage of total 
cumulative tariff revenue (Narsey); and in 
terms of the percentage of total cumulative 
revenue (Filmer and Lawson). This does not, 
however, explain why Narsey and Filmer 
and Lawson agree on the impact of the EPAs 
but not on the impact of PACER.
For example, for the impact of PACER 
on Kiribati, Scollay, Gilbert and Collins 
(1998) report a revenue loss of 58 per cent, 
Filmer and Lawson (1999) report a revenue 
loss of 52 per cent and Narsey (2004) reports 
a revenue loss of 82 per cent. The differ-
ences are not surprising as the estimates 
were made using different base years. 
Interestingly, the results are similar when 
the researchers estimate the tariff revenue 
losses from the implementation of the EPA. 
Although there are these differences, the 
three studies indicate that the loss in tariff 
revenue will be more significant for PACER 
than it will be for the EPA, which can be 
justified by the fact that trade between 
Table 2 Estimated tariff revenue losses from preferential trade agreements
Scollay, Gilbert and 
Collins (1998)
Filmer and Lawson 
(1999)
Narsey  
(2004)
Country EPA PACER EPA PACER EPA PACER
Cook Islands n.a. 46 2 22 n.a. n.a.
Fiji Islands n.a. 66 1 15 1 52
Federated States of Micronesia n.a. 5 0 1 n.a. n.a.
Kiribati n.a. 58 14 52 13 82
Nauru n.a. 75 2 95 n.a. n.a.
Niue n.a. 29 0 38 0 98
Palau n.a. 18 0 0 n.a. n.a.
Papua New Guinea n.a. 52 0 7 n.a. n.a.
Republic of Marshall Islands n.a. 7 0 2 0 8
Samoa n.a. 72 3 17 14 67
Solomon Islands n.a. 48 0 7 n.a. n.a.
Tonga n.a. 67 3 44 n.a. n.a.
Tuvalu n.a. n.a. 17 50 n.a. n.a.
Vanuatu n.a. 41 9 32 13 73
n.a. not applicable 
Notes: Scollay, Gilbert and Collins (1998) report the loss of tariff revenue in terms of the percentage of total tariff 
revenue; Narsey (2004) calculates the loss in terms of the percentage of the total cumulative tariff revenue; Filmer 
and Lawson (1999) report the percentage loss of total cumulative revenue. 
Sources: Scollay, R., Gilbert, J. and Collins, D., 1998. Free trade options for the forum island countries, Report 
prepared for the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, Suva, Fiji Islands; Narsey, W., 2004. Trade liberalisation and 
fiscal reform: towards a negotiating framework for Economic Partnership Agreements with the European Union, Report 
for the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat and the Pacific ACP Trade Experts Advisory Group Meeting, Suva, Fiji 
Islands; Filmer, R.J. and Lawson, T., 1999. The Fiscal Implications for Forum Island Countries of Alternative Proposals 
for Regional Free Trade Areas, Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, Suva, Fiji Islands.
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Australia and New Zealand and the Pacific 
island countries is much greater than trade 
between the European Union and the 
Pacific island countries. The example of 
Kiribati, however, shows that there is need 
for further research on the potential tariff 
revenue losses.4
The estimates of tariff revenue losses 
from Watergall Consulting Limited’s (2007) 
study are presented (Table 3). Tariff revenue 
losses are estimated for three liberalisation 
scenarios: 100 per cent, 80 per cent and 
67 per cent of the tariff lines by volume. 
Watergall Consulting Limited (2007) finds 
that the size of the tariff revenue loss in the 
short term will depend on Pacific island 
countries’ adaptation to the PACER and 
IPA/EPA arrangements. In the worst-case 
scenario (100 per cent liberalisation), it will 
take 10 years for the countries to regain the 
pre-liberalisation revenue-to-GDP ratios in 
the absence of other measures.
This study suggests almost no tariff 
revenue losses should be expected from 
trade liberalisation with the European 
Union. Moreover, the 17 per cent reduc-
tion of tariff revenue in Vanuatu is low 
compared with the 32 per cent estimate by 
Filmer and Lawson (1999) using the same 
measurement base.5 Watergall Consulting 
Limited’s (2007) PACER estimates for Fiji, 
Nauru, Kiribati and Tonga (for example) 
are also much lower. Therefore, this more 
recent study shows that some Pacific island 
countries have already adjusted their fiscal 
systems towards a more liberal trading 
Table 3 Tariff revenue losses for trade liberalisation scenarios (percentage of GDP)
EPA PACER
Countries/tariff lines 100% 80% 67% 100% 80% 67%
Cook Islands 0 0 0 6 6 5
Fiji Islands 0 0 0 2 2 2
Federated States of Micronesia 0 0 0 1 0 0
Kiribati 0 0 0 13 12 9
Nauru 0 0 0 5 n.a. n.a.
Niue 0 0 0 5 4 4
Palau 0 0 0 0 0 0
Papua New Guinea 0 0 0 1 1 1
Republic of Marshall Islands 0 0 0 5 n.a. n.a.
Samoa 0 0 0 9 9 9
Solomon Islands 0 0 0 3 2 2
Tonga 0 0 0 15 10 10
Tuvalu 0 0 0 4 3 3
Vanuatu 1 1 1 17 15 11
n.a. not applicable 
Notes: The 100 per cent, 80 per cent and 67 per cent scenarios refer to the extent of reduction of tariff lines, 
by volume. The assumptions are: no change in trade flows, no externalities and an oligopolistic business 
environment. 
Source: Watergall Consulting Limited, 2007. Responding to the revenue consequences of trade reforms in the forum 
island countries, Final report (September), Watergall Consulting Limited, Port Vila, Vanuatu.
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environment by diversifying their govern-
ment revenues away from a dependency 
on tariffs.
How best to adjust to trade 
liberalisation?
Recent studies, such as Watergall Consulting 
Limited (2007), suggest that gradual tariff 
reduction should be accompanied by tax 
diversification and thus by fiscal reforms. 
Moreover, tariff exemptions should be 
reduced or eliminated as far as possible. 
Fiscal reform can also be used to improve 
equity and minimise administrative costs for 
customs. To compensate for the tariff losses, 
a range of revenue raising measures can 
be considered. These include excise taxes, 
general consumption taxes such as the VAT, 
income tax and corporate tax. In reforming 
their fiscal regimes, Pacific island countries 
should set as a major goal improving the 
effectiveness of their customs and other tax-
collection agencies, including improvement 
in compliance, as discussed below.
Excise tax
An excise tax is a tax levied on specific 
goods, whether domestically produced or 
imported. Excise taxes are thus consistent 
with the WTO’s rules, on which the IPA/EPA 
and PACER trade liberalising arrangements 
are based—that is, that any tax or duty has 
to be imposed on domestic and foreign 
products in order to comply with the WTO’s 
non-discriminatory rule.
Excise taxes are commonly used as a 
so-called ‘sin tax’—a tax on goods that have 
important social costs, such as tobacco and 
alcohol. Excise taxes can also be applied to 
goods such as luxury cars and jewellery and 
are in effect a tax on the wealthy members 
of society. These goods are not very price 
sensitive (inelastic demand) and are thus 
very effective revenue raisers. Excise taxes 
can therefore serve a social agenda in terms 
of improving equity by taxing the rich and 
reducing the consumption of goods such as 
alcohol and tobacco, which have adverse 
health effects, as well as providing revenue 
to meet healthcare costs.
Personal income and corporate taxes
Income and corporate taxes are components 
of a tax regime. It has to be kept in mind, 
however, that personal income taxes 
presently add little to total tax revenue 
in Pacific island countries. Moreover, an 
increase in corporate taxes can be seen as a 
counter-productive step since the ultimate 
goal of trade liberalisation is to ensure 
greater international competitiveness of 
industry. An increase in corporate tax 
will reduce the competitiveness of the 
domestic industry and the attractiveness 
of the economy for investors. Further, 
corporations commonly treat a corporate 
tax as a turnover tax and attempt to pass 
on the tax increase to consumers through a 
price increase. An increase in the corporate 
tax to offset a tariff reduction will therefore 
ultimately reduce the welfare-improving 
effect of the tariff reductions.
Consumption taxes: the VAT6
The easiest consumption tax to implement 
is the VAT, which is already in place in some 
Pacific island countries. The VAT is also an 
effective way to adjust for potential tariff 
revenue losses. Many trade liberalisation 
opponents argue that imposing a VAT 
will increase the pressure on the poor, as 
the VAT is a regressive tax. First, however, 
the VAT is not necessarily more regressive 
than the tariffs it replaces, which are often 
imposed on goods that the poor spend a 
large proportion of their income on. Second, 
while not desirable, the VAT can be set 
at different rates for different products, 
with lower rates for products heavily 
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consumed by the poor. Therefore, when 
introducing a VAT, several key issues need 
to be considered—namely, the threshold for 
payment of the VAT, exemptions and zero 
ratings, and VAT audits.
Probably the most important issue and 
the main cause of failure of a VAT in small 
developing countries is the choice of the 
tax threshold. The threshold identifies the 
taxpayers who have to register for VAT 
in terms of their annual turnover. Ebrill, 
Keen, Bodin and Summers (2001) identify 
the best threshold to be zero if not for the 
administration costs faced by governments. 
The threshold should be high enough to 
avoid excessive registration of taxpayers, 
as this can easily overwhelm the capacity 
of Pacific island countries’ customs and 
inland-revenue authorities. At the begin-
ning, therefore, a high threshold should 
be adopted. This allows Pacific island 
countries’ customs and revenue authorities 
to concentrate their limited resources on 
the ‘large taxpayers’. Once the VAT is suc-
cessfully implemented and depending on 
their resources, Pacific island countries can 
gradually lower the threshold to capture a 
higher tax base and increase revenues.
Generally, zero ratings and exemptions 
should be avoided, simply because they 
can overwhelm the customs and revenue 
authorities dealing with claims and refunds. 
A large number of zero ratings and exemp-
tions increases administration costs and 
increases pressure on the large taxpayers 
as they have to bear the costs as customs 
and revenue authorities’ resources have 
to be withdrawn. This also applies to VAT 
audit programs. Before introducing the VAT, 
it needs to be understood that VAT audit, 
registration, and so on will run smoothly 
and do not need to be reinforced through 
an extensive audit program, which would 
increase costs hugely. Keeping the above 
in mind, a good VAT regime should have a 
high threshold, broad coverage, few or no 
exemptions and special procedures for the 
issuance of VAT refunds to exporting firms. 
For registration and auditing, a simple 
computerised tax system should be used for 
detection, control and enforcement.
In the more developed Pacific island 
countries such as Fiji or Cook Islands, and 
the largest economy, Papua New Guinea, 
VAT systems are already in place; the 
administrative costs of adjusting the VAT 
to the needs of the fiscal system should be 
relatively low in these countries compared 
with countries such as Kiribati, which do 
not have a VAT in place. In countries such 
as Kiribati and other very small Pacific 
island countries, where most of what is 
purchased for consumption is imported, 
it might be preferable to have a flat tariff 
on all imports. This would be essentially 
equivalent to a VAT.
Complementary reforms
Customs and other tax-collection agencies 
in the Pacific need to undergo reforms. Al-
though their role in collecting tariff revenue 
will diminish due to trade liberalisation, 
customs administrations will remain an 
important part of government revenue 
collection since they will be collecting most 
of the VAT through imports. Therefore, 
customs administrations need to be efficient. 
The chances are good that due to the 
lowering of tariffs and non-tariff barriers, 
trade will increase. Therefore, the collection 
of VAT and remaining customs duties 
should be made as easy as possible and 
should thereby improve trade facilitation.
Walsh (2006) recommends four major 
changes in devising a framework for com-
plementary reforms to taxation regimes
establish coherent trade policies and 1. 
clear legislative support
adopt simple, transparent procedures 2. 
in order to minimise abuse in the form 
of corruption
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shift to substantial reliance on taxpayer 3. 
self-assessment
introduce incentives and organisational 4. 
structures that promote integrity and 
effectiveness in customs administration; 
customs administrations must be 
given a clear mandate and be free of 
political interference and have adequate 
resources to carry out their tasks, which 
are the promotion of trade flows and 
increases in government revenues.
With the help of Australia, New Zealand 
and the European Commission, the Pacific 
Islands Forum Secretariat should develop a 
strategy for reform of government revenue 
regimes that could be adopted by all Pacific 
island countries.
Conclusions
Trade liberalisation by Pacific island countries 
is not about Australia and New Zealand 
‘exploiting their dominant economic power 
and capacity’ in ‘pursuit of ideological and 
economic self-interest by bullying the Pacific 
Islands into commitments they do not want’ 
(Kelsey 2004a:41). Pacific island countries do 
wish to benefit from the trade liberalisation 
movement taking place around the world. 
Yes, there will have to be adjustments in 
the production and financial structure of 
their economies. Trade liberalisation has 
to tackle the vested interests promoted by 
protection in the form of tariffs and non-tariff 
barriers. Those inefficient activities currently 
benefiting from protection will have to 
make adjustments, but other more efficient 
activities, employing even more people at 
higher incomes, will develop in their place.
This article has addressed the typical 
claims of trade liberalisation opponents with 
regard to potential revenue losses. Estimates 
of the potential impact of the EPA and PACER 
on tariff revenues vary from study to study 
due to the different assumptions made and 
the different times at which the estimates 
were made. Compared with earlier studies, 
the latest study of tariff revenue losses 
(Watergall Consulting Limited 2007) sug-
gests that potential tariff revenue losses have 
been declining significantly. This indicates 
that Pacific island countries have already 
started to adjust their fiscal systems towards 
trade liberalisation. One of the steps that six 
countries have taken is the introduction of a 
VAT. If implemented wisely, this tax can be 
effective in offsetting tariff revenue losses. 
Combined with an excise tax on ‘sinful’ 
goods, such as alcohol, tobacco and luxury 
goods, tariff revenue losses can be overcome 
while serving a social agenda.
Notes
1 Summarising all sales taxes under a VAT—for 
example, Tonga’s consumption tax.
2 Unless indicated differently.
3 For Samoa, Narsey (2004) calculated a loss 
of tariff revenue equivalent to 14 per cent of 
total cumulative tariff revenue.
4 For a discussion of the estimates obtained by 
Scollay, Gilbert and Collins (1998) and Filmer 
and Lawson (1999), see World Bank (2002).
5 Even though Filmer and Lawson (1999) 
measure the loss in terms of the percentage 
of total cumulative revenue.
6 For an interesting discussion, see Grandcolas 
(2004) on the VAT in Pacific islands.
References
Asian Development Bank (ADB), 2009. 
Key Indicators 2008, Asian Development 
Bank, Manila.
Council of the European Union, 2009. 
Interim Partnership Agreement between 
the European Community, of the one part, 
and the Pacific states, of the other part, 
5558/09 (8 May 2009), Council of the 
European Union, Brussels.
182
Pacific Economic BullEtin
Policy dialogue
Pacific Economic Bulletin Volume 24 Number 3 October 2009 © The Australian National University
Ebrill, L., Keen, M., Bodin, J.-P. and 
Summers, V., 2001. The Modern 
VAT, International Monetary Fund, 
Washington, DC. 
Filmer, R.J. and Lawson, T., 1999. The 
Fiscal Implications for Forum Island 
Countries of Alternative Proposals for 
Regional Free Trade Areas, Pacific Islands 
Forum Secretariat, Suva, Fiji Islands.
Grandcolas, C., 2004. ‘VAT in the Pacific 
islands’, Asian-Pacific Tax Bulletin, 
(January/February), International 
Bureau of Fiscal Documentation, 
Amsterdam, The Netherlands.
International Monetary Fund (IMF), 2009. 
International Finance Statistics (IFS) 
2008, International Monetary Fund, 
Washington, DC.
International Trade Centre (ICT), 2009. 
Market Access Map – Making import 
tariffs and market access barriers 
transparent. http://www.macmap.org.
Kelsey, J., 2004a. Big brothers behaving 
badly—the implications for the Pacific 
islands of the Pacific Agreement on Closer 
Economic Relations (PACER), Interim 
report, (April 2004), Commissioned by 
the Pacific Network on Globalisation, 
Suva, Fiji Islands.
Kelsey, J., 2004b. A people’s guide to 
PACER—the implications for the Pacific 
islands of the Pacific Agreement on Closer 
Economic Relations (PACER), Final 
report (August 2004), Commissioned 
by the Pacific Network on 
Globalisation, Suva, Fiji Islands.
Narsey, W., 2004. Trade liberalisation and 
fiscal reform: towards a negotiating 
framework for Economic Partnership 
Agreements with the European Union, 
Report for the Pacific Islands Forum 
Secretariat and the Pacific ACP Trade 
Experts Advisory Group Meeting, 
Suva, Fiji Islands.
Pacific Network on Globalisation (PANG), 
2008. Seminar on the Pacific–EU 
Economic Partnership Agreement, 
Madang, Papua New Guinea, 28–29 
April 2008.
——, 2009a. ‘Trade justice now! An 
update from the Pacific Network 
on Globalisation’, e-Update, (1) 
(March–April), Pacific Network on 
Globalisation, Suva, Fiji Islands.
——, 2009b. 10 reasons to challenge the 
Pacific Agreement on Closer Economic 
Relations (PACER-Plus), Fact sheet, 
(1) (April), Pacific Network on 
Globalisation, Suva, Fiji Islands.
Scollay, R., Gilbert, J. and Collins, D., 1998. 
Free trade options for the forum island 
countries, Report prepared for the 
Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, Suva, 
Fiji Islands.
United Nations Statistics Division 
(UNSD), 2008. National Accounts 2008, 
Statistics Division, United Nations, 
New York.
Walsh, J.T., 2006. ‘New customs’, Finance 
and Development: A quarterly magazine of 
the IMF, 43(1) (March).
Watergall Consulting Limited, 2007. 
Responding to the revenue consequences 
of trade reforms in the forum island 
countries, Final report, (September), 
Watergall Consulting Limited, Port 
Vila, Vanuatu.
World Bank, 2002. Pacific islands regional 
economic report—embarking on 
global voyage: trade liberalization and 
complementary reforms in the Pacific, 
Report 24417-EAP, 10 September, The 
World Bank, Washington, DC.
——, 2009a. Doing Business 2009, The 
World Bank, Washington, DC.
——, 2009b. World Development 
Indicators 2008, The World Bank, 
Washington, DC.
